Daily Papers

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Cascading bandits have gained popularity in recent years due to their applicability to recommendation systems and online advertising. In the cascading bandit model, at each timestep, an agent recommends an ordered subset of items (called an item list) from a pool of items, each associated with an unknown attraction probability. Then, the user examines the list, and clicks the first attractive item (if any), and after that, the agent receives a reward. The goal of the agent is to maximize the expected cumulative reward. However, the prior literature on cascading bandits ignores the influences of user states (e.g., historical behaviors) on recommendations and the change of states as the session proceeds. Motivated by this fact, we propose a generalized cascading RL framework, which considers the impact of user states and state transition into decisions. In cascading RL, we need to select items not only with large attraction probabilities but also leading to good successor states. This imposes a huge computational challenge due to the combinatorial action space. To tackle this challenge, we delve into the properties of value functions, and design an oracle BestPerm to efficiently find the optimal item list. Equipped with BestPerm, we develop two algorithms CascadingVI and CascadingBPI, which are both computationally-efficient and sample-efficient, and provide near-optimal regret and sample complexity guarantees. Furthermore, we present experiments to show the improved computational and sample efficiencies of our algorithms compared to straightforward adaptations of existing RL algorithms in practice.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

How well do AI systems perform in algorithm engineering for hard optimization problems in domains such as package-delivery routing, crew scheduling, factory production planning, and power-grid balancing? We introduce ALE-Bench, a new benchmark for evaluating AI systems on score-based algorithmic programming contests. Drawing on real tasks from the AtCoder Heuristic Contests, ALE-Bench presents optimization problems that are computationally hard and admit no known exact solution. Unlike short-duration, pass/fail coding benchmarks, ALE-Bench encourages iterative solution refinement over long time horizons. Our software framework supports interactive agent architectures that leverage test-run feedback and visualizations. Our evaluation of frontier LLMs revealed that while they demonstrate high performance on specific problems, a notable gap remains compared to humans in terms of consistency across problems and long-horizon problem-solving capabilities. This highlights the need for this benchmark to foster future AI advancements.

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.

The recently presented idea to learn heuristics for combinatorial optimization problems is promising as it can save costly development. However, to push this idea towards practical implementation, we need better models and better ways of training. We contribute in both directions: we propose a model based on attention layers with benefits over the Pointer Network and we show how to train this model using REINFORCE with a simple baseline based on a deterministic greedy rollout, which we find is more efficient than using a value function. We significantly improve over recent learned heuristics for the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), getting close to optimal results for problems up to 100 nodes. With the same hyperparameters, we learn strong heuristics for two variants of the Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP), the Orienteering Problem (OP) and (a stochastic variant of) the Prize Collecting TSP (PCTSP), outperforming a wide range of baselines and getting results close to highly optimized and specialized algorithms.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward g(gamma, v) depends on the proposed threshold gamma and latent value v and it can be only achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most epsilon smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when g(gamma, v) is monotone with respect to both gamma and v. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity Theta(1/epsilon^3) when g is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight Theta(1/epsilon^3) query complexity can be achieved as long as g satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight Theta(T^{2/3}) regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Bilevel optimization recently has received tremendous attention due to its great success in solving important machine learning problems like meta learning, reinforcement learning, and hyperparameter optimization. Extending single-agent training on bilevel problems to the decentralized setting is a natural generalization, and there has been a flurry of work studying decentralized bilevel optimization algorithms. However, it remains unknown how to design the distributed algorithm with sample complexity and convergence rate comparable to SGD for stochastic optimization, and at the same time without directly computing the exact Hessian or Jacobian matrices. In this paper we propose such an algorithm. More specifically, we propose a novel decentralized stochastic bilevel optimization (DSBO) algorithm that only requires first order stochastic oracle, Hessian-vector product and Jacobian-vector product oracle. The sample complexity of our algorithm matches the currently best known results for DSBO, and the advantage of our algorithm is that it does not require estimating the full Hessian and Jacobian matrices, thereby having improved per-iteration complexity.

We study the ranking of individuals, teams, or objects, based on pairwise comparisons between them, using the Bradley-Terry model. Estimates of rankings within this model are commonly made using a simple iterative algorithm first introduced by Zermelo almost a century ago. Here we describe an alternative and similarly simple iteration that provably returns identical results but does so much faster -- over a hundred times faster in some cases. We demonstrate this algorithm with applications to a range of example data sets and derive a number of results regarding its convergence.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

This paper discusses the system architecture design and deployment of non-stationary multi-armed bandit approaches to determine a near-optimal payment routing policy based on the recent history of transactions. We propose a Routing Service architecture using a novel Ray-based implementation for optimally scaling bandit-based payment routing to over 10,000 transactions per second, adhering to the system design requirements and ecosystem constraints with Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). We first evaluate the effectiveness of multiple bandit-based payment routing algorithms on a custom simulator to benchmark multiple non-stationary bandit approaches and identify the best hyperparameters. We then conducted live experiments on the payment transaction system on a fantasy sports platform Dream11. In the live experiments, we demonstrated that our non-stationary bandit-based algorithm consistently improves the success rate of transactions by 0.92% compared to the traditional rule-based methods over one month.

Algorithmic Recourse (AR) is the problem of computing a sequence of actions that -- once performed by a user -- overturns an undesirable machine decision. It is paramount that the sequence of actions does not require too much effort for users to implement. Yet, most approaches to AR assume that actions cost the same for all users, and thus may recommend unfairly expensive recourse plans to certain users. Prompted by this observation, we introduce PEAR, the first human-in-the-loop approach capable of providing personalized algorithmic recourse tailored to the needs of any end-user. PEAR builds on insights from Bayesian Preference Elicitation to iteratively refine an estimate of the costs of actions by asking choice set queries to the target user. The queries themselves are computed by maximizing the Expected Utility of Selection, a principled measure of information gain accounting for uncertainty on both the cost estimate and the user's responses. PEAR integrates elicitation into a Reinforcement Learning agent coupled with Monte Carlo Tree Search to quickly identify promising recourse plans. Our empirical evaluation on real-world datasets highlights how PEAR produces high-quality personalized recourse in only a handful of iterations.

In online algorithm selection (OAS), instances of an algorithmic problem class are presented to an agent one after another, and the agent has to quickly select a presumably best algorithm from a fixed set of candidate algorithms. For decision problems such as satisfiability (SAT), quality typically refers to the algorithm's runtime. As the latter is known to exhibit a heavy-tail distribution, an algorithm is normally stopped when exceeding a predefined upper time limit. As a consequence, machine learning methods used to optimize an algorithm selection strategy in a data-driven manner need to deal with right-censored samples, a problem that has received little attention in the literature so far. In this work, we revisit multi-armed bandit algorithms for OAS and discuss their capability of dealing with the problem. Moreover, we adapt them towards runtime-oriented losses, allowing for partially censored data while keeping a space- and time-complexity independent of the time horizon. In an extensive experimental evaluation on an adapted version of the ASlib benchmark, we demonstrate that theoretically well-founded methods based on Thompson sampling perform specifically strong and improve in comparison to existing methods.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We consider multi-draft speculative sampling, where the proposal sequences are sampled independently from different draft models. At each step, a token-level draft selection scheme takes a list of valid tokens as input and produces an output token whose distribution matches that of the target model. Previous works have demonstrated that the optimal scheme (which maximizes the probability of accepting one of the input tokens) can be cast as a solution to a linear program. In this work we show that the optimal scheme can be decomposed into a two-step solution: in the first step an importance sampling (IS) type scheme is used to select one intermediate token; in the second step (single-draft) speculative sampling is applied to generate the output token. For the case of two identical draft models we further 1) establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the distributions of the target and draft models for the acceptance probability to equal one and 2) provide an explicit expression for the optimal acceptance probability. Our theoretical analysis also motives a new class of token-level selection scheme based on weighted importance sampling. Our experimental results demonstrate consistent improvements in the achievable block efficiency and token rates over baseline schemes in a number of scenarios.

We formulate and solve the H-SARA Problem, a Vehicle Routing and Appointment Scheduling Problem motivated by home services management. We assume that travel times, service durations, and customer cancellations are stochastic. We use a two-stage process that first generates teams and routes using a VRP Solver with optional extensions and then uses an MC Scheduler that determines expected arrival times by teams at customers. We further introduce two different models of cancellation and their associated impacts on routing and scheduling. Finally, we introduce the Route Fracture Metaheuristic that iteratively improves an H-SARA solution by replacing the worst-performing teams. We present insights into the problem and a series of numerical experiments that illustrate properties of the optimal routing, scheduling, and the impact of the Route Fracture Metaheuristic for both models of cancellation.

We propose a general two-stage algorithm that enjoys a provable scaling law for the test-time compute of large language models (LLMs). Given an input problem, the proposed algorithm first generates N candidate solutions, and then chooses the best one via a multiple-round knockout tournament where each pair of candidates are compared for K times and only the winners move on to the next round. In a minimalistic implementation, both stages can be executed with a black-box LLM alone and nothing else (e.g., no external verifier or reward model), and a total of N times (K + 1) highly parallelizable LLM calls are needed for solving an input problem. Assuming that a generated candidate solution is correct with probability p_{gen} > 0 and a comparison between a pair of correct and incorrect solutions identifies the right winner with probability p_{comp} > 0.5 (i.e., better than a random guess), we prove theoretically that the failure probability of the proposed algorithm decays to zero exponentially with respect to N and K: $P(final output is incorrect) le (1 - p_{gen})^N + lceil log_2 N rceil e^{-2 K (p_{comp} - 0.5)^2}.$ Our empirical results with the challenging MMLU-Pro benchmark validate the technical assumptions, as well as the efficacy of the proposed algorithm and the gains from scaling up its test-time compute.

Learning heuristics for vehicle routing problems (VRPs) has gained much attention due to the less reliance on hand-crafted rules. However, existing methods are typically trained and tested on the same task with a fixed size and distribution (of nodes), and hence suffer from limited generalization performance. This paper studies a challenging yet realistic setting, which considers generalization across both size and distribution in VRPs. We propose a generic meta-learning framework, which enables effective training of an initialized model with the capability of fast adaptation to new tasks during inference. We further develop a simple yet efficient approximation method to reduce the training overhead. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and benchmark instances of the traveling salesman problem (TSP) and capacitated vehicle routing problem (CVRP) demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. The code is available at: https://github.com/RoyalSkye/Omni-VRP.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated strong capabilities across diverse domains. However, designing high-performing agentic systems remains challenging. Existing agent search methods suffer from three major limitations: (1) an emphasis on optimizing agentic workflows while under-utilizing proven human-designed components such as memory, planning, and tool use; (2) high evaluation costs, as each newly generated agent must be fully evaluated on benchmarks; and (3) inefficient search in large search space. In this work, we introduce a comprehensive framework to address these challenges. First, We propose a hierarchical search space that jointly models agentic workflow and composable functional components, enabling richer agentic system designs. Building on this structured design space, we introduce a predictive value model that estimates agent performance given agentic system and task description, allowing for efficient, low-cost evaluation during the search process. Finally, we present a hierarchical Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) strategy informed by uncertainty to guide the search. Experiments on seven benchmarks, covering embodied, math, web, tool, and game, show that our method achieves an average performance gain of 8.34\% over state-of-the-art baselines and exhibits faster search progress with steeper improvement trajectories. Code repo is available at https://github.com/Ericccc02/AgentSwift.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

We consider non-clairvoyant scheduling with online precedence constraints, where an algorithm is oblivious to any job dependencies and learns about a job only if all of its predecessors have been completed. Given strong impossibility results in classical competitive analysis, we investigate the problem in a learning-augmented setting, where an algorithm has access to predictions without any quality guarantee. We discuss different prediction models: novel problem-specific models as well as general ones, which have been proposed in previous works. We present lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for different precedence topologies, and thereby give a structured overview on which and how additional (possibly erroneous) information helps for designing better algorithms. Along the way, we also improve bounds on traditional competitive ratios for existing algorithms.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

This presentation focuses on the importance of web crawling and page ranking algorithms in dealing with the massive amount of data present on the World Wide Web. As the web continues to grow exponentially, efficient search and retrieval methods become crucial. Web crawling is a process that converts unstructured data into structured data, enabling effective information retrieval. Additionally, page ranking algorithms play a significant role in assessing the quality and popularity of web pages. The presentation explores the background of these algorithms and evaluates five different crawling algorithms: Shark Search, Priority-Based Queue, Naive Bayes, Breadth-First, and Depth-First. The goal is to identify the most effective algorithm for crawling web pages. By understanding these algorithms, we can enhance our ability to navigate the web and extract valuable information efficiently.

This work proposes a procedure for designing algorithms for specific adaptive data collection tasks like active learning and pure-exploration multi-armed bandits. Unlike the design of traditional adaptive algorithms that rely on concentration of measure and careful analysis to justify the correctness and sample complexity of the procedure, our adaptive algorithm is learned via adversarial training over equivalence classes of problems derived from information theoretic lower bounds. In particular, a single adaptive learning algorithm is learned that competes with the best adaptive algorithm learned for each equivalence class. Our procedure takes as input just the available queries, set of hypotheses, loss function, and total query budget. This is in contrast to existing meta-learning work that learns an adaptive algorithm relative to an explicit, user-defined subset or prior distribution over problems which can be challenging to define and be mismatched to the instance encountered at test time. This work is particularly focused on the regime when the total query budget is very small, such as a few dozen, which is much smaller than those budgets typically considered by theoretically derived algorithms. We perform synthetic experiments to justify the stability and effectiveness of the training procedure, and then evaluate the method on tasks derived from real data including a noisy 20 Questions game and a joke recommendation task.

LLM-based web agents have recently made significant progress, but much of it has occurred in closed-source systems, widening the gap with open-source alternatives. Progress has been held back by two key challenges: first, a narrow focus on single-step tasks that overlooks the complexity of multi-step web interactions; and second, the high compute costs required to post-train LLM-based web agents. To address this, we present the first statistically grounded study on compute allocation for LLM web-agent post-training. Our approach uses a two-stage pipeline, training a Llama 3.1 8B student to imitate a Llama 3.3 70B teacher via supervised fine-tuning (SFT), followed by on-policy reinforcement learning. We find this process highly sensitive to hyperparameter choices, making exhaustive sweeps impractical. To spare others from expensive trial-and-error, we sample 1,370 configurations and use bootstrapping to estimate effective hyperparameters. Our results show that combining SFT with on-policy RL consistently outperforms either approach alone on both WorkArena and MiniWob++. Further, this strategy requires only 55% of the compute to match the peak performance of pure SFT on MiniWob++, effectively pushing the compute-performance Pareto frontier, and is the only strategy that can close the gap with closed-source models.

This paper explores multi-scenario optimization on large platforms using multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). We address this by treating scenarios like search, recommendation, and advertising as a cooperative, partially observable multi-agent decision problem. We introduce the Multi-Agent Recurrent Deterministic Policy Gradient (MARDPG) algorithm, which aligns different scenarios under a shared objective and allows for strategy communication to boost overall performance. Our results show marked improvements in metrics such as click-through rate (CTR), conversion rate, and total sales, confirming our method's efficacy in practical settings.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

Recent studies in using deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to solve Job-shop scheduling problems (JSSP) focus on construction heuristics. However, their performance is still far from optimality, mainly because the underlying graph representation scheme is unsuitable for modelling partial solutions at each construction step. This paper proposes a novel DRL-guided improvement heuristic for solving JSSP, where graph representation is employed to encode complete solutions. We design a Graph Neural-Network-based representation scheme, consisting of two modules to effectively capture the information of dynamic topology and different types of nodes in graphs encountered during the improvement process. To speed up solution evaluation during improvement, we present a novel message-passing mechanism that can evaluate multiple solutions simultaneously. We prove that the computational complexity of our method scales linearly with problem size. Experiments on classic benchmarks show that the improvement policy learned by our method outperforms state-of-the-art DRL-based methods by a large margin.

Multi-agent systems commonly distribute tasks among specialized, autonomous agents, yet they often lack mechanisms to replace or reassign underperforming agents in real time. Inspired by the free-agency model of Major League Baseball, the Reinforcement Learning Free Agent (RLFA) algorithm introduces a reward-based mechanism to detect and remove agents exhibiting persistent underperformance and seamlessly insert more capable ones. Each agent internally uses a mixture-of-experts (MoE) approach, delegating incoming tasks to specialized sub-models under the guidance of a gating function. A primary use case is fraud detection, where RLFA promptly swaps out an agent whose detection accuracy dips below a preset threshold. A new agent is tested in a probationary mode, and upon demonstrating superior performance, fully replaces the underperformer. This dynamic, free-agency cycle ensures sustained accuracy, quicker adaptation to emerging threats, and minimal disruption to ongoing operations. By continually refreshing its roster of agents, the system fosters ongoing improvements and more resilient collaboration in multi-agent Generative AI environments.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Active learning (AL) algorithms may achieve better performance with fewer data because the model guides the data selection process. While many algorithms have been proposed, there is little study on what the optimal AL algorithm looks like, which would help researchers understand where their models fall short and iterate on the design. In this paper, we present a simulated annealing algorithm to search for this optimal oracle and analyze it for several tasks. We present qualitative and quantitative insights into the behaviors of this oracle, comparing and contrasting them with those of various heuristics. Moreover, we are able to consistently improve the heuristics using one particular insight. We hope that our findings can better inform future active learning research. The code is available at https://github.com/YilunZhou/optimal-active-learning.

A major technique in learning-augmented online algorithms is combining multiple algorithms or predictors. Since the performance of each predictor may vary over time, it is desirable to use not the single best predictor as a benchmark, but rather a dynamic combination which follows different predictors at different times. We design algorithms that combine predictions and are competitive against such dynamic combinations for a wide class of online problems, namely, metrical task systems. Against the best (in hindsight) unconstrained combination of ell predictors, we obtain a competitive ratio of O(ell^2), and show that this is best possible. However, for a benchmark with slightly constrained number of switches between different predictors, we can get a (1+epsilon)-competitive algorithm. Moreover, our algorithms can be adapted to access predictors in a bandit-like fashion, querying only one predictor at a time. An unexpected implication of one of our lower bounds is a new structural insight about covering formulations for the k-server problem.

Sparse mixture of experts (SMoE) offers an appealing solution to scale up the model complexity beyond the mean of increasing the network's depth or width. However, we argue that effective SMoE training remains challenging because of the suboptimal routing process where experts that perform computation do not directly contribute to the routing process. In this work, we propose competition, a novel mechanism to route tokens to experts with the highest neural response. Theoretically, we show that the competition mechanism enjoys a better sample efficiency than the traditional softmax routing. Furthermore, we develop CompeteSMoE, a simple yet effective algorithm to train large language models by deploying a router to learn the competition policy, thus enjoying strong performances at a low training overhead. Our extensive empirical evaluations on both the visual instruction tuning and language pre-training tasks demonstrate the efficacy, robustness, and scalability of CompeteSMoE compared to state-of-the-art SMoE strategies. We have made the implementation available at: https://github.com/Fsoft-AIC/CompeteSMoE. This work is an improved version of the previous study at arXiv:2402.02526

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

As a telecom provider, our company has a critical mission to maintain telecom services even during power outages. To accomplish the mission, it is essential to maintain the power of the telecom base stations. Here we consider a solution where electric vehicles (EVs) directly supply power to base stations by traveling to their locations. The goal is to find EV routes that minimize both the total travel distance of all EVs and the number of downed base stations. In this paper, we formulate this routing problem as a new variant of the Electric Vehicle Routing Problem (EVRP) and propose a solver that combines a rule-based vehicle selector and a reinforcement learning (RL)-based node selector. The rule of the vehicle selector ensures the exact environmental states when the selected EV starts to move. In addition, the node selection by the RL model enables fast route generation, which is critical in emergencies. We evaluate our solver on both synthetic datasets and real datasets. The results show that our solver outperforms baselines in terms of the objective value and computation time. Moreover, we analyze the generalization and scalability of our solver, demonstrating the capability toward unseen settings and large-scale problems. Check also our project page: https://ntt-dkiku.github.io/rl-evrpeps.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Discovering efficient algorithms for solving complex problems has been an outstanding challenge in mathematics and computer science, requiring substantial human expertise over the years. Recent advancements in evolutionary search with large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in accelerating the discovery of algorithms across various domains, particularly in mathematics and optimization. However, existing approaches treat the LLM as a static generator, missing the opportunity to update the model with the signal obtained from evolutionary exploration. In this work, we propose to augment LLM-based evolutionary search by continuously refining the search operator - the LLM - through reinforcement learning (RL) fine-tuning. Our method leverages evolutionary search as an exploration strategy to discover improved algorithms, while RL optimizes the LLM policy based on these discoveries. Our experiments on three combinatorial optimization tasks - bin packing, traveling salesman, and the flatpack problem - show that combining RL and evolutionary search improves discovery efficiency of improved algorithms, showcasing the potential of RL-enhanced evolutionary strategies to assist computer scientists and mathematicians for more efficient algorithm design.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

We study the algorithm configuration (AC) problem, in which one seeks to find an optimal parameter configuration of a given target algorithm in an automated way. Recently, there has been significant progress in designing AC approaches that satisfy strong theoretical guarantees. However, a significant gap still remains between the practical performance of these approaches and state-of-the-art heuristic methods. To this end, we introduce AC-Band, a general approach for the AC problem based on multi-armed bandits that provides theoretical guarantees while exhibiting strong practical performance. We show that AC-Band requires significantly less computation time than other AC approaches providing theoretical guarantees while still yielding high-quality configurations.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Many problems, such as online ad display, can be formulated as online bipartite matching. The crucial challenge lies in the nature of sequentially-revealed online item information, based on which we make irreversible matching decisions at each step. While numerous expert online algorithms have been proposed with bounded worst-case competitive ratios, they may not offer satisfactory performance in average cases. On the other hand, reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to improve the average performance, but it lacks robustness and can perform arbitrarily poorly. In this paper, we propose a novel RL-based approach to edge-weighted online bipartite matching with robustness guarantees (LOMAR), achieving both good average-case and worst-case performance. The key novelty of LOMAR is a new online switching operation which, based on a judicious condition to hedge against future uncertainties, decides whether to follow the expert's decision or the RL decision for each online item. We prove that for any rhoin[0,1], LOMAR is rho-competitive against any given expert online algorithm. To improve the average performance, we train the RL policy by explicitly considering the online switching operation. Finally, we run empirical experiments to demonstrate the advantages of LOMAR compared to existing baselines. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Ren-Research/LOMAR

Progress in fields of machine learning and adversarial planning has benefited significantly from benchmark domains, from checkers and the classic UCI data sets to Go and Diplomacy. In sequential decision-making, agent evaluation has largely been restricted to few interactions against experts, with the aim to reach some desired level of performance (e.g. beating a human professional player). We propose a benchmark for multiagent learning based on repeated play of the simple game Rock, Paper, Scissors along with a population of forty-three tournament entries, some of which are intentionally sub-optimal. We describe metrics to measure the quality of agents based both on average returns and exploitability. We then show that several RL, online learning, and language model approaches can learn good counter-strategies and generalize well, but ultimately lose to the top-performing bots, creating an opportunity for research in multiagent learning.

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

The MineRL competition is designed for the development of reinforcement learning and imitation learning algorithms that can efficiently leverage human demonstrations to drastically reduce the number of environment interactions needed to solve the complex ObtainDiamond task with sparse rewards. To address the challenge, in this paper, we present SEIHAI, a Sample-efficient Hierarchical AI, that fully takes advantage of the human demonstrations and the task structure. Specifically, we split the task into several sequentially dependent subtasks, and train a suitable agent for each subtask using reinforcement learning and imitation learning. We further design a scheduler to select different agents for different subtasks automatically. SEIHAI takes the first place in the preliminary and final of the NeurIPS-2020 MineRL competition.

There has been a recent surge in interest in the application of artificial intelligence to automated trading. Reinforcement learning has been applied to single- and multi-instrument use cases, such as market making or portfolio management. This paper proposes a new approach to framing cryptocurrency market making as a reinforcement learning challenge by introducing an event-based environment wherein an event is defined as a change in price greater or less than a given threshold, as opposed to by tick or time-based events (e.g., every minute, hour, day, etc.). Two policy-based agents are trained to learn a market making trading strategy using eight days of training data and evaluate their performance using 30 days of testing data. Limit order book data recorded from Bitmex exchange is used to validate this approach, which demonstrates improved profit and stability compared to a time-based approach for both agents when using a simple multi-layer perceptron neural network for function approximation and seven different reward functions.

We study reinforcement learning for global decision-making in the presence of many local agents, where the global decision-maker makes decisions affecting all local agents, and the objective is to learn a policy that maximizes the rewards of both the global and the local agents. Such problems find many applications, e.g. demand response, EV charging, queueing, etc. In this setting, scalability has been a long-standing challenge due to the size of the state/action space which can be exponential in the number of agents. This work proposes the SUB-SAMPLE-Q algorithm where the global agent subsamples kleq n local agents to compute an optimal policy in time that is only exponential in k, providing an exponential speedup from standard methods that are exponential in n. We show that the learned policy converges to the optimal policy in the order of O(1/k+epsilon_{k,m}) as the number of sub-sampled agents k increases, where epsilon_{k,m} is the Bellman noise. We also conduct numerical simulations in a demand-response setting and a queueing setting.

In this paper, we present improved learning-augmented algorithms for the multi-option ski rental problem. Learning-augmented algorithms take ML predictions as an added part of the input and incorporates these predictions in solving the given problem. Due to their unique strength that combines the power of ML predictions with rigorous performance guarantees, they have been extensively studied in the context of online optimization problems. Even though ski rental problems are one of the canonical problems in the field of online optimization, only deterministic algorithms were previously known for multi-option ski rental, with or without learning augmentation. We present the first randomized learning-augmented algorithm for this problem, surpassing previous performance guarantees given by deterministic algorithms. Our learning-augmented algorithm is based on a new, provably best-possible randomized competitive algorithm for the problem. Our results are further complemented by lower bounds for deterministic and randomized algorithms, and computational experiments evaluating our algorithms' performance improvements.

Applying reinforcement learning (RL) to combinatorial optimization problems is attractive as it removes the need for expert knowledge or pre-solved instances. However, it is unrealistic to expect an agent to solve these (often NP-)hard problems in a single shot at inference due to their inherent complexity. Thus, leading approaches often implement additional search strategies, from stochastic sampling and beam search to explicit fine-tuning. In this paper, we argue for the benefits of learning a population of complementary policies, which can be simultaneously rolled out at inference. To this end, we introduce Poppy, a simple training procedure for populations. Instead of relying on a predefined or hand-crafted notion of diversity, Poppy induces an unsupervised specialization targeted solely at maximizing the performance of the population. We show that Poppy produces a set of complementary policies, and obtains state-of-the-art RL results on four popular NP-hard problems: traveling salesman, capacitated vehicle routing, 0-1 knapsack, and job-shop scheduling.

We consider the problem of preference based reinforcement learning (PbRL), where, unlike traditional reinforcement learning, an agent receives feedback only in terms of a 1 bit (0/1) preference over a trajectory pair instead of absolute rewards for them. The success of the traditional RL framework crucially relies on the underlying agent-reward model, which, however, depends on how accurately a system designer can express an appropriate reward function and often a non-trivial task. The main novelty of our framework is the ability to learn from preference-based trajectory feedback that eliminates the need to hand-craft numeric reward models. This paper sets up a formal framework for the PbRL problem with non-markovian rewards, where the trajectory preferences are encoded by a generalized linear model of dimension d. Assuming the transition model is known, we then propose an algorithm with almost optimal regret guarantee of mathcal{O}left( SH d log (T / delta) T right). We further, extend the above algorithm to the case of unknown transition dynamics, and provide an algorithm with near optimal regret guarantee mathcal{O}((d + H^2 + |S|)dT +|mathcal{S||A|TH} ). To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of the first to give tight regret guarantees for preference based RL problems with trajectory preferences.

The Combined Algorithm Selection and Hyperparameter optimization (CASH) is one of the most fundamental problems in Automatic Machine Learning (AutoML). The existing Bayesian optimization (BO) based solutions turn the CASH problem into a Hyperparameter Optimization (HPO) problem by combining the hyperparameters of all machine learning (ML) algorithms, and use BO methods to solve it. As a result, these methods suffer from the low-efficiency problem due to the huge hyperparameter space in CASH. To alleviate this issue, we propose the alternating optimization framework, where the HPO problem for each ML algorithm and the algorithm selection problem are optimized alternately. In this framework, the BO methods are used to solve the HPO problem for each ML algorithm separately, incorporating a much smaller hyperparameter space for BO methods. Furthermore, we introduce Rising Bandits, a CASH-oriented Multi-Armed Bandits (MAB) variant, to model the algorithm selection in CASH. This framework can take the advantages of both BO in solving the HPO problem with a relatively small hyperparameter space and the MABs in accelerating the algorithm selection. Moreover, we further develop an efficient online algorithm to solve the Rising Bandits with provably theoretical guarantees. The extensive experiments on 30 OpenML datasets demonstrate the superiority of the proposed approach over the competitive baselines.

Despite the success of neural-based combinatorial optimization methods for end-to-end heuristic learning, out-of-distribution generalization remains a challenge. In this paper, we present a novel formulation of Combinatorial Optimization Problems (COPs) as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) that effectively leverages common symmetries of COPs to improve out-of-distribution robustness. Starting from a direct MDP formulation of a constructive method, we introduce a generic way to reduce the state space, based on Bisimulation Quotienting (BQ) in MDPs. Then, for COPs with a recursive nature, we specialize the bisimulation and show how the reduced state exploits the symmetries of these problems and facilitates MDP solving. Our approach is principled and we prove that an optimal policy for the proposed BQ-MDP actually solves the associated COPs. We illustrate our approach on five classical problems: the Euclidean and Asymmetric Traveling Salesman, Capacitated Vehicle Routing, Orienteering and Knapsack Problems. Furthermore, for each problem, we introduce a simple attention-based policy network for the BQ-MDPs, which we train by imitation of (near) optimal solutions of small instances from a single distribution. We obtain new state-of-the-art results for the five COPs on both synthetic and realistic benchmarks. Notably, in contrast to most existing neural approaches, our learned policies show excellent generalization performance to much larger instances than seen during training, without any additional search procedure.

Optimization can be found in many real-life applications. Designing an effective algorithm for a specific optimization problem typically requires a tedious amount of effort from human experts with domain knowledge and algorithm design skills. In this paper, we propose a novel approach called Algorithm Evolution using Large Language Model (AEL). It utilizes a large language model (LLM) to automatically generate optimization algorithms via an evolutionary framework. AEL does algorithm-level evolution without model training. Human effort and requirements for domain knowledge can be significantly reduced. We take constructive methods for the salesman traveling problem as a test example, we show that the constructive algorithm obtained by AEL outperforms simple hand-crafted and LLM-generated heuristics. Compared with other domain deep learning model-based algorithms, these methods exhibit excellent scalability across different problem sizes. AEL is also very different from previous attempts that utilize LLMs as search operators in algorithms.

The Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) is a widely studied combinatorial optimization problem and has been applied to various practical problems. While the explainability for VRP is significant for improving the reliability and interactivity in practical VRP applications, it remains unexplored. In this paper, we propose RouteExplainer, a post-hoc explanation framework that explains the influence of each edge in a generated route. Our framework realizes this by rethinking a route as the sequence of actions and extending counterfactual explanations based on the action influence model to VRP. To enhance the explanation, we additionally propose an edge classifier that infers the intentions of each edge, a loss function to train the edge classifier, and explanation-text generation by Large Language Models (LLMs). We quantitatively evaluate our edge classifier on four different VRPs. The results demonstrate its rapid computation while maintaining reasonable accuracy, thereby highlighting its potential for deployment in practical applications. Moreover, on the subject of a tourist route, we qualitatively evaluate explanations generated by our framework. This evaluation not only validates our framework but also shows the synergy between explanation frameworks and LLMs. See https://ntt-dkiku.github.io/xai-vrp for our code, datasets, models, and demo.

We give a quantum algorithm for computing an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game in a m times n payoff matrix with bounded entries. Given a standard quantum oracle for accessing the payoff matrix our algorithm runs in time O(m + ncdot epsilon^{-2.5} + epsilon^{-3}) and outputs a classical representation of the epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium. This improves upon the best prior quantum runtime of O(m + n cdot epsilon^{-3}) obtained by [vAG19] and the classic O((m + n) cdot epsilon^{-2}) runtime due to [GK95] whenever epsilon = Omega((m +n)^{-1}). We obtain this result by designing new quantum data structures for efficiently sampling from a slowly-changing Gibbs distribution.

Floor labels of crowdsourced RF signals are crucial for many smart-city applications, such as multi-floor indoor localization, geofencing, and robot surveillance. To build a prediction model to identify the floor number of a new RF signal upon its measurement, conventional approaches using the crowdsourced RF signals assume that at least few labeled signal samples are available on each floor. In this work, we push the envelope further and demonstrate that it is technically feasible to enable such floor identification with only one floor-labeled signal sample on the bottom floor while having the rest of signal samples unlabeled. We propose FIS-ONE, a novel floor identification system with only one labeled sample. FIS-ONE consists of two steps, namely signal clustering and cluster indexing. We first build a bipartite graph to model the RF signal samples and obtain a latent representation of each node (each signal sample) using our attention-based graph neural network model so that the RF signal samples can be clustered more accurately. Then, we tackle the problem of indexing the clusters with proper floor labels, by leveraging the observation that signals from an access point can be detected on different floors, i.e., signal spillover. Specifically, we formulate a cluster indexing problem as a combinatorial optimization problem and show that it is equivalent to solving a traveling salesman problem, whose (near-)optimal solution can be found efficiently. We have implemented FIS-ONE and validated its effectiveness on the Microsoft dataset and in three large shopping malls. Our results show that FIS-ONE outperforms other baseline algorithms significantly, with up to 23% improvement in adjusted rand index and 25% improvement in normalized mutual information using only one floor-labeled signal sample.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

Is the lottery ticket phenomenon an idiosyncrasy of gradient-based training or does it generalize to evolutionary optimization? In this paper we establish the existence of highly sparse trainable initializations for evolution strategies (ES) and characterize qualitative differences compared to gradient descent (GD)-based sparse training. We introduce a novel signal-to-noise iterative pruning procedure, which incorporates loss curvature information into the network pruning step. This can enable the discovery of even sparser trainable network initializations when using black-box evolution as compared to GD-based optimization. Furthermore, we find that these initializations encode an inductive bias, which transfers across different ES, related tasks and even to GD-based training. Finally, we compare the local optima resulting from the different optimization paradigms and sparsity levels. In contrast to GD, ES explore diverse and flat local optima and do not preserve linear mode connectivity across sparsity levels and independent runs. The results highlight qualitative differences between evolution and gradient-based learning dynamics, which can be uncovered by the study of iterative pruning procedures.

LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in addressing complex, agentic tasks, from generating high-quality presentation slides to even conducting sophisticated scientific research. Meanwhile, RL has been widely recognized for its effectiveness in enhancing agent intelligence, but limited research has investigated the fine-tuning of LaMAS using foundational RL techniques. Moreover, the direct application of MARL methods to LaMAS introduces significant challenges, stemming from the unique characteristics and mechanisms inherent to LaMAS. To address these challenges, this article presents a comprehensive study of LLM-based MARL and proposes a novel paradigm termed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (MARFT). We introduce a brand-new POMDP called Flex-POMDP, which aligns with the LaMAS optimization in real-world applications and a universal algorithmic framework tailored specifically for LaMAS, outlining the conceptual foundations, key distinctions, and practical implementation strategies. We review the evolution from RL to RFT, setting the stage for a parallel analysis in the multi-agent domain. In the context of LaMAS, we elucidate critical differences between MARL and MARFT. These differences motivate a transition toward a LaMAS-oriented formulation of RFT. Central to this work is a robust and scalable MARFT framework. We detail the core algorithm and provide a complete, open-source implementation to facilitate adoption and further research. The latter sections of the paper explore real-world application perspectives and opening challenges in MARFT. By bridging theoretical underpinnings with practical methodologies, this work serves as a roadmap for researchers seeking to advance MARFT toward resilient and adaptive solutions in agentic systems. Our implementation of the proposed framework is publicly available at: https://github.com/jwliao-ai/MARFT.

Handcrafting heuristics for solving complex planning tasks (e.g., NP-hard combinatorial optimization (CO) problems) is a common practice but requires extensive domain knowledge. Recently, Large Language Model (LLM)-based automatic heuristics design (AHD) methods have shown promise in generating high-quality heuristics without manual intervention. Existing LLM-based AHD methods employ a population to maintain a fixed number of top-performing LLM-generated heuristics and introduce evolutionary computation (EC) to enhance the population iteratively. However, the population-based procedure brings greedy properties, often resulting in convergence to local optima. Instead, to more comprehensively explore the space of heuristics, we propose using Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) for LLM-based heuristic evolution while preserving all LLM-generated heuristics in a tree structure. With a novel thought-alignment process and an exploration-decay technique, the proposed MCTS-AHD method delivers significantly higher-quality heuristics on various complex tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/zz1358m/MCTS-AHD-master.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

The profiled vehicle routing problem (PVRP) is a generalization of the heterogeneous capacitated vehicle routing problem (HCVRP) in which the objective is to optimize the routes of vehicles to serve client demands subject to different vehicle profiles, with each having a preference or constraint on a per-client basis. While existing learning methods have shown promise for solving the HCVRP in real-time, no learning method exists to solve the more practical and challenging PVRP. In this paper, we propose a Collaborative Attention Model with Profiles (CAMP), a novel approach that learns efficient solvers for PVRP using multi-agent reinforcement learning. CAMP employs a specialized attention-based encoder architecture to embed profiled client embeddings in parallel for each vehicle profile. We design a communication layer between agents for collaborative decision-making across profiled embeddings at each decoding step and a batched pointer mechanism to attend to the profiled embeddings to evaluate the likelihood of the next actions. We evaluate CAMP on two variants of PVRPs: PVRP with preferences, which explicitly influence the reward function, and PVRP with zone constraints with different numbers of agents and clients, demonstrating that our learned solvers achieve competitive results compared to both classical state-of-the-art neural multi-agent models in terms of solution quality and computational efficiency. We make our code openly available at https://github.com/ai4co/camp.

LLM-based autonomous agents often fail to execute complex web tasks that require dynamic interaction due to the inherent uncertainty and complexity of these environments. Existing LLM-based web agents typically rely on rigid, expert-designed policies specific to certain states and actions, which lack the flexibility and generalizability needed to adapt to unseen tasks. In contrast, humans excel by exploring unknowns, continuously adapting strategies, and resolving ambiguities through exploration. To emulate human-like adaptability, web agents need strategic exploration and complex decision-making. Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is well-suited for this, but classical MCTS struggles with vast action spaces, unpredictable state transitions, and incomplete information in web tasks. In light of this, we develop WebPilot, a multi-agent system with a dual optimization strategy that improves MCTS to better handle complex web environments. Specifically, the Global Optimization phase involves generating a high-level plan by breaking down tasks into manageable subtasks and continuously refining this plan, thereby focusing the search process and mitigating the challenges posed by vast action spaces in classical MCTS. Subsequently, the Local Optimization phase executes each subtask using a tailored MCTS designed for complex environments, effectively addressing uncertainties and managing incomplete information. Experimental results on WebArena and MiniWoB++ demonstrate the effectiveness of WebPilot. Notably, on WebArena, WebPilot achieves SOTA performance with GPT-4, achieving a 93% relative increase in success rate over the concurrent tree search-based method. WebPilot marks a significant advancement in general autonomous agent capabilities, paving the way for more advanced and reliable decision-making in practical environments.

Reinforcement Learning algorithms that learn from human feedback (RLHF) need to be efficient in terms of statistical complexity, computational complexity, and query complexity. In this work, we consider the RLHF setting where the feedback is given in the format of preferences over pairs of trajectories. In the linear MDP model, using randomization in algorithm design, we present an algorithm that is sample efficient (i.e., has near-optimal worst-case regret bounds) and has polynomial running time (i.e., computational complexity is polynomial with respect to relevant parameters). Our algorithm further minimizes the query complexity through a novel randomized active learning procedure. In particular, our algorithm demonstrates a near-optimal tradeoff between the regret bound and the query complexity. To extend the results to more general nonlinear function approximation, we design a model-based randomized algorithm inspired by the idea of Thompson sampling. Our algorithm minimizes Bayesian regret bound and query complexity, again achieving a near-optimal tradeoff between these two quantities. Computation-wise, similar to the prior Thompson sampling algorithms under the regular RL setting, the main computation primitives of our algorithm are Bayesian supervised learning oracles which have been heavily investigated on the empirical side when applying Thompson sampling algorithms to RL benchmark problems.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

Preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL) is an approach that enables RL agents to learn from preference, which is particularly useful when formulating a reward function is challenging. Existing PbRL methods generally involve a two-step procedure: they first learn a reward model based on given preference data and then employ off-the-shelf reinforcement learning algorithms using the learned reward model. However, obtaining an accurate reward model solely from preference information, especially when the preference is from human teachers, can be difficult. Instead, we propose a PbRL algorithm that directly learns from preference without requiring any reward modeling. To achieve this, we adopt a contrastive learning framework to design a novel policy scoring metric that assigns a high score to policies that align with the given preferences. We apply our algorithm to offline RL tasks with actual human preference labels and show that our algorithm outperforms or is on par with the existing PbRL methods. Notably, on high-dimensional control tasks, our algorithm surpasses offline RL methods that learn with ground-truth reward information. Finally, we show that our algorithm can be successfully applied to fine-tune large language models.

Although LLM-based agents have attracted significant attention in domains such as software engineering and machine learning research, their role in advancing combinatorial optimization (CO) remains relatively underexplored. This gap underscores the need for a deeper understanding of their potential in tackling structured, constraint-intensive problems-a pursuit currently limited by the absence of comprehensive benchmarks for systematic investigation. To address this, we introduce CO-Bench, a benchmark suite featuring 36 real-world CO problems drawn from a broad range of domains and complexity levels. CO-Bench includes structured problem formulations and curated data to support rigorous investigation of LLM agents. We evaluate multiple agent frameworks against established human-designed algorithms, revealing key strengths and limitations of current approaches and identifying promising directions for future research. CO-Bench is publicly available at https://github.com/sunnweiwei/CO-Bench.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

Combinatorial Optimization underpins many real-world applications and yet, designing performant algorithms to solve these complex, typically NP-hard, problems remains a significant research challenge. Reinforcement Learning (RL) provides a versatile framework for designing heuristics across a broad spectrum of problem domains. However, despite notable progress, RL has not yet supplanted industrial solvers as the go-to solution. Current approaches emphasize pre-training heuristics that construct solutions but often rely on search procedures with limited variance, such as stochastically sampling numerous solutions from a single policy or employing computationally expensive fine-tuning of the policy on individual problem instances. Building on the intuition that performant search at inference time should be anticipated during pre-training, we propose COMPASS, a novel RL approach that parameterizes a distribution of diverse and specialized policies conditioned on a continuous latent space. We evaluate COMPASS across three canonical problems - Travelling Salesman, Capacitated Vehicle Routing, and Job-Shop Scheduling - and demonstrate that our search strategy (i) outperforms state-of-the-art approaches on 11 standard benchmarking tasks and (ii) generalizes better, surpassing all other approaches on a set of 18 procedurally transformed instance distributions.

This paper proposes a novel admission and routing scheme which takes into account arbitrarily assigned priorities for network flows. The presented approach leverages the centralized Software Defined Networking (SDN) capabilities in order to do so. Exact and heuristic approaches to the stated Priority Flow Admission and Routing (PFAR) problem are provided. The exact approach which provides an optimal solution is based on Integer Linear Programming (ILP). Given the potentially long running time required to find an exact and optimal solution, a heuristic approach is proposed; this approach is based on Genetic Algorithms (GAs). In order to effectively estimate the performance of the proposed approaches, a simulator that is capable of generating semi-random network topologies and flows has been developed. Experimental results for large problem instances (up 50 network nodes and thousands of network flows), show that: i) an optimal solution can be often found in few seconds (even milliseconds), and ii) the heuristic approach yields close-to-optimal solutions (approximately 95\% of the optimal) in a fixed amount of time; these experimental results demonstrate the pertinence of the proposed approaches.

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

Selecting the best code solution from multiple generated ones is an essential task in code generation, which can be achieved by using some reliable validators (e.g., developer-written test cases) for assistance. Since reliable test cases are not always available and can be expensive to build in practice, researchers propose to automatically generate test cases to assess code solutions. However, when both code solutions and test cases are plausible and not reliable, selecting the best solution becomes challenging. Although some heuristic strategies have been proposed to tackle this problem, they lack a strong theoretical guarantee and it is still an open question whether an optimal selection strategy exists. Our work contributes in two ways. First, we show that within a Bayesian framework, the optimal selection strategy can be defined based on the posterior probability of the observed passing states between solutions and tests. The problem of identifying the best solution is then framed as an integer programming problem. Second, we propose an efficient approach for approximating this optimal (yet uncomputable) strategy, where the approximation error is bounded by the correctness of prior knowledge. We then incorporate effective prior knowledge to tailor code generation tasks. Both theoretical and empirical studies confirm that existing heuristics are limited in selecting the best solutions with plausible test cases. Our proposed approximated optimal strategy B4 significantly surpasses existing heuristics in selecting code solutions generated by large language models (LLMs) with LLM-generated tests, achieving a relative performance improvement by up to 50% over the strongest heuristic and 246% over the random selection in the most challenging scenarios. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/ZJU-CTAG/B4.

We study preferential Bayesian optimization (BO) where reliable feedback is limited to pairwise comparison called duels. An important challenge in preferential BO, which uses the preferential Gaussian process (GP) model to represent flexible preference structure, is that the posterior distribution is a computationally intractable skew GP. The most widely used approach for preferential BO is Gaussian approximation, which ignores the skewness of the true posterior. Alternatively, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based preferential BO is also proposed. In this work, we first verify the accuracy of Gaussian approximation, from which we reveal the critical problem that the predictive probability of duels can be inaccurate. This observation motivates us to improve the MCMC-based estimation for skew GP, for which we show the practical efficiency of Gibbs sampling and derive the low variance MC estimator. However, the computational time of MCMC can still be a bottleneck in practice. Towards building a more practical preferential BO, we develop a new method that achieves both high computational efficiency and low sample complexity, and then demonstrate its effectiveness through extensive numerical experiments.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

We consider a combinatorial multi-armed bandit problem for maximum value reward function under maximum value and index feedback. This is a new feedback structure that lies in between commonly studied semi-bandit and full-bandit feedback structures. We propose an algorithm and provide a regret bound for problem instances with stochastic arm outcomes according to arbitrary distributions with finite supports. The regret analysis rests on considering an extended set of arms, associated with values and probabilities of arm outcomes, and applying a smoothness condition. Our algorithm achieves a O((k/Delta)log(T)) distribution-dependent and a O(T) distribution-independent regret where k is the number of arms selected in each round, Delta is a distribution-dependent reward gap and T is the horizon time. Perhaps surprisingly, the regret bound is comparable to previously-known bound under more informative semi-bandit feedback. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm through experimental results.

This paper introduces RouteFinder, a comprehensive foundation model framework to tackle different Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) variants. Our core idea is that a foundation model for VRPs should be able to represent variants by treating each as a subset of a generalized problem equipped with different attributes. We propose a unified VRP environment capable of efficiently handling any attribute combination. The RouteFinder model leverages a modern transformer-based encoder and global attribute embeddings to improve task representation. Additionally, we introduce two reinforcement learning techniques to enhance multi-task performance: mixed batch training, which enables training on different variants at once, and multi-variant reward normalization to balance different reward scales. Finally, we propose efficient adapter layers that enable fine-tuning for new variants with unseen attributes. Extensive experiments on 48 VRP variants show RouteFinder outperforms recent state-of-the-art learning methods. Code: https://github.com/ai4co/routefinder.

Combinatorial optimization problems involving multiple agents are notoriously challenging due to their NP-hard nature and the necessity for effective agent coordination. Despite advancements in learning-based methods, existing approaches often face critical limitations, including suboptimal agent coordination, poor generalizability, and high computational latency. To address these issues, we propose Parallel AutoRegressive Combinatorial Optimization (PARCO), a reinforcement learning framework designed to construct high-quality solutions for multi-agent combinatorial tasks efficiently. To this end, PARCO integrates three key components: (1) transformer-based communication layers to enable effective agent collaboration during parallel solution construction, (2) a multiple pointer mechanism for low-latency, parallel agent decision-making, and (3) priority-based conflict handlers to resolve decision conflicts via learned priorities. We evaluate PARCO in multi-agent vehicle routing and scheduling problems where our approach outperforms state-of-the-art learning methods and demonstrates strong generalization ability and remarkable computational efficiency. Code available at: https://github.com/ai4co/parco.

To address the challenges of limited Battery Swap Stations datasets, high operational costs, and fluctuating user charging demand, this research proposes a probability estimation model based on charging pile data and constructs nine scenario-specific battery swap demand datasets. In addition, this study combines Least Recently Used strategy with Genetic Algorithm and incorporates a guided search mechanism, which effectively enhances the global optimization capability. Thus, a dual-factor decision-making based charging schedule optimization system is constructed. Experimental results show that the constructed datasets exhibit stable trend characteristics, adhering to 24-hour and 168-hour periodicity patterns, with outlier ratios consistently below 3.26%, confirming data validity. Compared to baseline, the improved algorithm achieves better fitness individuals in 80% of test regions under the same iterations. When benchmarked against immediate swap-and-charge strategy, our algorithm achieves a peak cost reduction of 13.96%. Moreover, peak user satisfaction reaches 98.57%, while the average iteration time remains below 0.6 seconds, demonstrating good computational efficiency. The complete datasets and optimization algorithm are open-sourced at https://github.com/qingshufan/GA-EVLRU.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning in the setting of episodic Markov decision processes, where multiple agents cooperate via communication through a central server. We propose a provably efficient algorithm based on value iteration that enable asynchronous communication while ensuring the advantage of cooperation with low communication overhead. With linear function approximation, we prove that our algorithm enjoys an mathcal{O}(d^{3/2}H^2K) regret with mathcal{O}(dHM^2) communication complexity, where d is the feature dimension, H is the horizon length, M is the total number of agents, and K is the total number of episodes. We also provide a lower bound showing that a minimal Omega(dM) communication complexity is required to improve the performance through collaboration.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

We consider the problem of ranking n experts based on their performances on d tasks. We make a monotonicity assumption stating that for each pair of experts, one outperforms the other on all tasks. We consider the sequential setting where in each round, the learner has access to noisy evaluations of actively chosen pair of expert-task, given the information available up to the actual round. Given a confidence parameter delta in (0, 1), we provide strategies allowing to recover the correct ranking of experts and develop a bound on the total number of queries made by our algorithm that hold with probability at least 1 -- delta. We show that our strategy is adaptive to the complexity of the problem (our bounds are instance dependent), and develop matching lower bounds up to a poly-logarithmic factor. Finally, we adapt our strategy to the relaxed problem of best expert identification and provide numerical simulation consistent with our theoretical results.

A broad use case of large language models (LLMs) is in goal-directed decision-making tasks (or "agent" tasks), where an LLM needs to not just generate completions for a given prompt, but rather make intelligent decisions over a multi-turn interaction to accomplish a task (e.g., when interacting with the web, using tools, or providing customer support). Reinforcement learning (RL) provides a general paradigm to address such agent tasks, but current RL methods for LLMs largely focus on optimizing single-turn rewards. By construction, most single-turn RL methods cannot endow LLMs with the ability to intelligently seek information over multiple turns, perform credit assignment, or reason about their past actions -- all of which are critical in agent tasks. This raises the question: how can we design effective and efficient multi-turn RL algorithms for LLMs? In this paper, we develop a framework for building multi-turn RL algorithms for fine-tuning LLMs, that preserves the flexibility of existing single-turn RL methods for LLMs (e.g., proximal policy optimization), while accommodating multiple turns, long horizons, and delayed rewards effectively. To do this, our framework adopts a hierarchical RL approach and runs two RL algorithms in parallel: a high-level off-policy value-based RL algorithm to aggregate reward over utterances, and a low-level RL algorithm that utilizes this high-level value function to train a token policy within each utterance or turn. Our hierarchical framework, Actor-Critic Framework with a Hierarchical Structure (ArCHer), can also give rise to other RL methods. Empirically, we find that ArCHer significantly improves efficiency and performance on agent tasks, attaining a sample efficiency of about 100x over existing methods, while also improving with larger model capacity (upto the 7 billion scale that we tested on).

Choosing automatically the right algorithm using problem descriptors is a classical component of combinatorial optimization. It is also a good tool for making evolutionary algorithms fast, robust and versatile. We present Shiwa, an algorithm good at both discrete and continuous, noisy and noise-free, sequential and parallel, black-box optimization. Our algorithm is experimentally compared to competitors on YABBOB, a BBOB comparable testbed, and on some variants of it, and then validated on several real world testbeds.

Web agents enable users to perform tasks on web browsers through natural language interaction. Evaluating web agents trajectories is an important problem, since it helps us determine whether the agent successfully completed the tasks. Rule-based methods are widely used for this purpose, but they are challenging to extend to new tasks and may not always recognize successful trajectories. We may achieve higher accuracy through human evaluation, but the process would be substantially slower and more expensive. Automatic evaluations with LLMs may avoid the challenges of designing new rules and manually annotating trajectories, enabling faster and cost-effective evaluation. However, it is unclear how effective they are at evaluating web agents. To this end, we propose AgentRewardBench, the first benchmark to assess the effectiveness of LLM judges for evaluating web agents. AgentRewardBench contains 1302 trajectories across 5 benchmarks and 4 LLMs. Each trajectory in AgentRewardBench is reviewed by an expert, who answers questions pertaining to the success, side effects, and repetitiveness of the agent. Using our benchmark, we evaluate 12 LLM judges and find that no single LLM excels across all benchmarks. We also find that the rule-based evaluation used by common benchmarks tends to underreport the success rate of web agents, highlighting a key weakness of rule-based evaluation and the need to develop more flexible automatic evaluations. We release the benchmark at: https://agent-reward-bench.github.io

We study the design of sample-efficient algorithms for reinforcement learning in the presence of rich, high-dimensional observations, formalized via the Block MDP problem. Existing algorithms suffer from either 1) computational intractability, 2) strong statistical assumptions that are not necessarily satisfied in practice, or 3) suboptimal sample complexity. We address these issues by providing the first computationally efficient algorithm that attains rate-optimal sample complexity with respect to the desired accuracy level, with minimal statistical assumptions. Our algorithm, MusIK, combines systematic exploration with representation learning based on multi-step inverse kinematics, a learning objective in which the aim is to predict the learner's own action from the current observation and observations in the (potentially distant) future. MusIK is simple and flexible, and can efficiently take advantage of general-purpose function approximation. Our analysis leverages several new techniques tailored to non-optimistic exploration algorithms, which we anticipate will find broader use.

With the development of LLMs as agents, there is a growing interest in connecting multiple agents into multi-agent systems to solve tasks concurrently, focusing on their role in task assignment and coordination. This paper explores how LLMs can effectively allocate computational tasks among multiple agents, considering factors such as cost, efficiency, and performance. In this work, we address key questions, including the effectiveness of LLMs as orchestrators and planners, comparing their effectiveness in task assignment and coordination. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMs can achieve high validity and accuracy in resource allocation tasks. We find that the planner method outperforms the orchestrator method in handling concurrent actions, resulting in improved efficiency and better utilization of agents. Additionally, we show that providing explicit information about worker capabilities enhances the allocation strategies of planners, particularly when dealing with suboptimal workers.

Robust routing under uncertainty is central to real-world logistics, yet most benchmarks assume static, idealized settings. We present SVRPBench, the first open benchmark to capture high-fidelity stochastic dynamics in vehicle routing at urban scale. Spanning more than 500 instances with up to 1000 customers, it simulates realistic delivery conditions: time-dependent congestion, log-normal delays, probabilistic accidents, and empirically grounded time windows for residential and commercial clients. Our pipeline generates diverse, constraint-rich scenarios, including multi-depot and multi-vehicle setups. Benchmarking reveals that state-of-the-art RL solvers like POMO and AM degrade by over 20% under distributional shift, while classical and metaheuristic methods remain robust. To enable reproducible research, we release the dataset and evaluation suite. SVRPBench challenges the community to design solvers that generalize beyond synthetic assumptions and adapt to real-world uncertainty.

Grokking is one of the most surprising puzzles in neural network generalization: a network first reaches a memorization solution with perfect training accuracy and poor generalization, but with further training, it reaches a perfectly generalized solution. We aim to analyze the mechanism of grokking from the lottery ticket hypothesis, identifying the process to find the lottery tickets (good sparse subnetworks) as the key to describing the transitional phase between memorization and generalization. We refer to these subnetworks as ''Grokking tickets'', which is identified via magnitude pruning after perfect generalization. First, using ''Grokking tickets'', we show that the lottery tickets drastically accelerate grokking compared to the dense networks on various configurations (MLP and Transformer, and an arithmetic and image classification tasks). Additionally, to verify that ''Grokking ticket'' are a more critical factor than weight norms, we compared the ''good'' subnetworks with a dense network having the same L1 and L2 norms. Results show that the subnetworks generalize faster than the controlled dense model. In further investigations, we discovered that at an appropriate pruning rate, grokking can be achieved even without weight decay. We also show that speedup does not happen when using tickets identified at the memorization solution or transition between memorization and generalization or when pruning networks at the initialization (Random pruning, Grasp, SNIP, and Synflow). The results indicate that the weight norm of network parameters is not enough to explain the process of grokking, but the importance of finding good subnetworks to describe the transition from memorization to generalization. The implementation code can be accessed via this link: https://github.com/gouki510/Grokking-Tickets.

We consider online scheduling on unrelated (heterogeneous) machines in a speed-oblivious setting, where an algorithm is unaware of the exact job-dependent processing speeds. We show strong impossibility results for clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant algorithms and overcome them in models inspired by practical settings: (i) we provide competitive learning-augmented algorithms, assuming that (possibly erroneous) predictions on the speeds are given, and (ii) we provide competitive algorithms for the speed-ordered model, where a single global order of machines according to their unknown job-dependent speeds is known. We prove strong theoretical guarantees and evaluate our findings on a representative heterogeneous multi-core processor. These seem to be the first empirical results for scheduling algorithms with predictions that are evaluated in a non-synthetic hardware environment.

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive evaluation -- since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all available tasks and agents.

LLMs have shown impressive progress in robotics (e.g., manipulation and navigation) with natural language task descriptions. The success of LLMs in these tasks leads us to wonder: What is the ability of LLMs to solve vehicle routing problems (VRPs) with natural language task descriptions? In this work, we study this question in three steps. First, we construct a dataset with 21 types of single- or multi-vehicle routing problems. Second, we evaluate the performance of LLMs across four basic prompt paradigms of text-to-code generation, each involving different types of text input. We find that the basic prompt paradigm, which generates code directly from natural language task descriptions, performs the best for GPT-4, achieving 56% feasibility, 40% optimality, and 53% efficiency. Third, based on the observation that LLMs may not be able to provide correct solutions at the initial attempt, we propose a framework that enables LLMs to refine solutions through self-reflection, including self-debugging and self-verification. With GPT-4, our proposed framework achieves a 16% increase in feasibility, a 7% increase in optimality, and a 15% increase in efficiency. Moreover, we examine the sensitivity of GPT-4 to task descriptions, specifically focusing on how its performance changes when certain details are omitted from the task descriptions, yet the core meaning is preserved. Our findings reveal that such omissions lead to a notable decrease in performance: 4% in feasibility, 4% in optimality, and 5% in efficiency. Website: https://sites.google.com/view/words-to-routes/

Like generic multi-task learning, continual learning has the nature of multi-objective optimization, and therefore faces a trade-off between the performance of different tasks. That is, to optimize for the current task distribution, it may need to compromise performance on some previous tasks. This means that there exist multiple models that are Pareto-optimal at different times, each addressing a distinct task performance trade-off. Researchers have discussed how to train particular models to address specific trade-off preferences. However, existing algorithms require training overheads proportional to the number of preferences -- a large burden when there are multiple, possibly infinitely many, preferences. As a response, we propose Imprecise Bayesian Continual Learning (IBCL). Upon a new task, IBCL (1) updates a knowledge base in the form of a convex hull of model parameter distributions and (2) obtains particular models to address task trade-off preferences with zero-shot. That is, IBCL does not require any additional training overhead to generate preference-addressing models from its knowledge base. We show that models obtained by IBCL have guarantees in identifying the Pareto optimal parameters. Moreover, experiments on standard image classification and NLP tasks support this guarantee. Statistically, IBCL improves average per-task accuracy by at most 23% and peak per-task accuracy by at most 15% with respect to the baseline methods, with steadily near-zero or positive backward transfer. Most importantly, IBCL significantly reduces the training overhead from training 1 model per preference to at most 3 models for all preferences.

Paging is a prototypical problem in the area of online algorithms. It has also played a central role in the development of learning-augmented algorithms -- a recent line of research that aims to ameliorate the shortcomings of classical worst-case analysis by giving algorithms access to predictions. Such predictions can typically be generated using a machine learning approach, but they are inherently imperfect. Previous work on learning-augmented paging has investigated predictions on (i) when the current page will be requested again (reoccurrence predictions), (ii) the current state of the cache in an optimal algorithm (state predictions), (iii) all requests until the current page gets requested again, and (iv) the relative order in which pages are requested. We study learning-augmented paging from the new perspective of requiring the least possible amount of predicted information. More specifically, the predictions obtained alongside each page request are limited to one bit only. We consider two natural such setups: (i) discard predictions, in which the predicted bit denotes whether or not it is ``safe'' to evict this page, and (ii) phase predictions, where the bit denotes whether the current page will be requested in the next phase (for an appropriate partitioning of the input into phases). We develop algorithms for each of the two setups that satisfy all three desirable properties of learning-augmented algorithms -- that is, they are consistent, robust and smooth -- despite being limited to a one-bit prediction per request. We also present lower bounds establishing that our algorithms are essentially best possible.

Existing benchmarks for grounding language in interactive environments either lack real-world linguistic elements, or prove difficult to scale up due to substantial human involvement in the collection of data or feedback signals. To bridge this gap, we develop WebShop -- a simulated e-commerce website environment with 1.18 million real-world products and 12,087 crowd-sourced text instructions. Given a text instruction specifying a product requirement, an agent needs to navigate multiple types of webpages and issue diverse actions to find, customize, and purchase an item. WebShop provides several challenges for language grounding including understanding compositional instructions, query (re-)formulation, comprehending and acting on noisy text in webpages, and performing strategic exploration. We collect over 1,600 human demonstrations for the task, and train and evaluate a diverse range of agents using reinforcement learning, imitation learning, and pre-trained image and language models. Our best model achieves a task success rate of 29%, which outperforms rule-based heuristics (9.6%) but is far lower than human expert performance (59%). We also analyze agent and human trajectories and ablate various model components to provide insights for developing future agents with stronger language understanding and decision making abilities. Finally, we show that agents trained on WebShop exhibit non-trivial sim-to-real transfer when evaluated on amazon.com and ebay.com, indicating the potential value of WebShop in developing practical web-based agents that can operate in the wild.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is a widely used offline preference optimization algorithm that reparameterizes reward functions in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to enhance simplicity and training stability. In this work, we propose SimPO, a simpler yet more effective approach. The effectiveness of SimPO is attributed to a key design: using the average log probability of a sequence as the implicit reward. This reward formulation better aligns with model generation and eliminates the need for a reference model, making it more compute and memory efficient. Additionally, we introduce a target reward margin to the Bradley-Terry objective to encourage a larger margin between the winning and losing responses, further enhancing the algorithm's performance. We compare SimPO to DPO and its latest variants across various state-of-the-art training setups, including both base and instruction-tuned models like Mistral and Llama3. We evaluated on extensive instruction-following benchmarks, including AlpacaEval 2, MT-Bench, and the recent challenging Arena-Hard benchmark. Our results demonstrate that SimPO consistently and significantly outperforms existing approaches without substantially increasing response length. Specifically, SimPO outperforms DPO by up to 6.4 points on AlpacaEval 2 and by up to 7.5 points on Arena-Hard. Our top-performing model, built on Llama3-8B-Instruct, achieves a remarkable 44.7 length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2 -- surpassing Claude 3 Opus on the leaderboard, and a 33.8 win rate on Arena-Hard -- making it the strongest 8B open-source model.

In this work, we consider the problem of collaborative multi-user reinforcement learning. In this setting there are multiple users with the same state-action space and transition probabilities but with different rewards. Under the assumption that the reward matrix of the N users has a low-rank structure -- a standard and practically successful assumption in the offline collaborative filtering setting -- the question is can we design algorithms with significantly lower sample complexity compared to the ones that learn the MDP individually for each user. Our main contribution is an algorithm which explores rewards collaboratively with N user-specific MDPs and can learn rewards efficiently in two key settings: tabular MDPs and linear MDPs. When N is large and the rank is constant, the sample complexity per MDP depends logarithmically over the size of the state-space, which represents an exponential reduction (in the state-space size) when compared to the standard ``non-collaborative'' algorithms.

In this paper we propose two algorithms in the tabular setting and an algorithm for the function approximation setting for the Stochastic Shortest Path (SSP) problem. SSP problems form an important class of problems in Reinforcement Learning (RL), as other types of cost-criteria in RL can be formulated in the setting of SSP. We show asymptotic almost-sure convergence for all our algorithms. We observe superior performance of our tabular algorithms compared to other well-known convergent RL algorithms. We further observe reliable performance of our function approximation algorithm compared to other algorithms in the function approximation setting.

With the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), LLM-based agents have been widely adopted in various fields, becoming essential for autonomous decision-making and interactive tasks. However, current work typically relies on prompt design or fine-tuning strategies applied to vanilla LLMs, which often leads to limited effectiveness or suboptimal performance in complex agent-related environments. Although LLM optimization techniques can improve model performance across many general tasks, they lack specialized optimization towards critical agent functionalities such as long-term planning, dynamic environmental interaction, and complex decision-making. Although numerous recent studies have explored various strategies to optimize LLM-based agents for complex agent tasks, a systematic review summarizing and comparing these methods from a holistic perspective is still lacking. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of LLM-based agent optimization approaches, categorizing them into parameter-driven and parameter-free methods. We first focus on parameter-driven optimization, covering fine-tuning-based optimization, reinforcement learning-based optimization, and hybrid strategies, analyzing key aspects such as trajectory data construction, fine-tuning techniques, reward function design, and optimization algorithms. Additionally, we briefly discuss parameter-free strategies that optimize agent behavior through prompt engineering and external knowledge retrieval. Finally, we summarize the datasets and benchmarks used for evaluation and tuning, review key applications of LLM-based agents, and discuss major challenges and promising future directions. Our repository for related references is available at https://github.com/YoungDubbyDu/LLM-Agent-Optimization.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

We study single-machine scheduling of jobs, each belonging to a job type that determines its duration distribution. We start by analyzing the scenario where the type characteristics are known and then move to two learning scenarios where the types are unknown: non-preemptive problems, where each started job must be completed before moving to another job; and preemptive problems, where job execution can be paused in the favor of moving to a different job. In both cases, we design algorithms that achieve sublinear excess cost, compared to the performance with known types, and prove lower bounds for the non-preemptive case. Notably, we demonstrate, both theoretically and through simulations, how preemptive algorithms can greatly outperform non-preemptive ones when the durations of different job types are far from one another, a phenomenon that does not occur when the type durations are known.

AI agents are increasingly used in consumer-facing applications to assist with tasks such as product search, negotiation, and transaction execution. In this paper, we explore a future scenario where both consumers and merchants authorize AI agents to fully automate negotiations and transactions. We aim to answer two key questions: (1) Do different LLM agents vary in their ability to secure favorable deals for users? (2) What risks arise from fully automating deal-making with AI agents in consumer markets? To address these questions, we develop an experimental framework that evaluates the performance of various LLM agents in real-world negotiation and transaction settings. Our findings reveal that AI-mediated deal-making is an inherently imbalanced game -- different agents achieve significantly different outcomes for their users. Moreover, behavioral anomalies in LLMs can result in financial losses for both consumers and merchants, such as overspending or accepting unreasonable deals. These results underscore that while automation can improve efficiency, it also introduces substantial risks. Users should exercise caution when delegating business decisions to AI agents.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

Reinforcement learning has demonstrated great potential for performing financial tasks. However, it faces two major challenges: policy instability and sampling bottlenecks. In this paper, we revisit ensemble methods with massively parallel simulations on graphics processing units (GPUs), significantly enhancing the computational efficiency and robustness of trained models in volatile financial markets. Our approach leverages the parallel processing capability of GPUs to significantly improve the sampling speed for training ensemble models. The ensemble models combine the strengths of component agents to improve the robustness of financial decision-making strategies. We conduct experiments in both stock and cryptocurrency trading tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. Massively parallel simulation on a single GPU improves the sampling speed by up to 1,746times using 2,048 parallel environments compared to a single environment. The ensemble models have high cumulative returns and outperform some individual agents, reducing maximum drawdown by up to 4.17% and improving the Sharpe ratio by up to 0.21. This paper describes trading tasks at ACM ICAIF FinRL Contests in 2023 and 2024.

We resolve the open question regarding the sample complexity of policy learning for maximizing the long-run average reward associated with a uniformly ergodic Markov decision process (MDP), assuming a generative model. In this context, the existing literature provides a sample complexity upper bound of widetilde O(|S||A|t_{mix}^2 epsilon^{-2}) and a lower bound of Omega(|S||A|t_{mix} epsilon^{-2}). In these expressions, |S| and |A| denote the cardinalities of the state and action spaces respectively, t_{mix} serves as a uniform upper limit for the total variation mixing times, and epsilon signifies the error tolerance. Therefore, a notable gap of t_{mix} still remains to be bridged. Our primary contribution is the development of an estimator for the optimal policy of average reward MDPs with a sample complexity of widetilde O(|S||A|t_{mix}epsilon^{-2}). This marks the first algorithm and analysis to reach the literature's lower bound. Our new algorithm draws inspiration from ideas in Li et al. (2020), Jin and Sidford (2021), and Wang et al. (2023). Additionally, we conduct numerical experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

Many fields use search algorithms, which automatically explore a search space to find high-performing solutions: chemists search through the space of molecules to discover new drugs; engineers search for stronger, cheaper, safer designs, scientists search for models that best explain data, etc. The goal of search algorithms has traditionally been to return the single highest-performing solution in a search space. Here we describe a new, fundamentally different type of algorithm that is more useful because it provides a holistic view of how high-performing solutions are distributed throughout a search space. It creates a map of high-performing solutions at each point in a space defined by dimensions of variation that a user gets to choose. This Multi-dimensional Archive of Phenotypic Elites (MAP-Elites) algorithm illuminates search spaces, allowing researchers to understand how interesting attributes of solutions combine to affect performance, either positively or, equally of interest, negatively. For example, a drug company may wish to understand how performance changes as the size of molecules and their cost-to-produce vary. MAP-Elites produces a large diversity of high-performing, yet qualitatively different solutions, which can be more helpful than a single, high-performing solution. Interestingly, because MAP-Elites explores more of the search space, it also tends to find a better overall solution than state-of-the-art search algorithms. We demonstrate the benefits of this new algorithm in three different problem domains ranging from producing modular neural networks to designing simulated and real soft robots. Because MAP- Elites (1) illuminates the relationship between performance and dimensions of interest in solutions, (2) returns a set of high-performing, yet diverse solutions, and (3) improves finding a single, best solution, it will advance science and engineering.

Customer Lifetime Value (CLTV) prediction is a critical task in business applications. Accurately predicting CLTV is challenging in real-world business scenarios, as the distribution of CLTV is complex and mutable. Firstly, there is a large number of users without any consumption consisting of a long-tailed part that is too complex to fit. Secondly, the small set of high-value users spent orders of magnitude more than a typical user leading to a wide range of the CLTV distribution which is hard to capture in a single distribution. Existing approaches for CLTV estimation either assume a prior probability distribution and fit a single group of distribution-related parameters for all samples, or directly learn from the posterior distribution with manually predefined buckets in a heuristic manner. However, all these methods fail to handle complex and mutable distributions. In this paper, we propose a novel optimal distribution selection model OptDist for CLTV prediction, which utilizes an adaptive optimal sub-distribution selection mechanism to improve the accuracy of complex distribution modeling. Specifically, OptDist trains several candidate sub-distribution networks in the distribution learning module (DLM) for modeling the probability distribution of CLTV. Then, a distribution selection module (DSM) is proposed to select the sub-distribution for each sample, thus making the selection automatically and adaptively. Besides, we design an alignment mechanism that connects both modules, which effectively guides the optimization. We conduct extensive experiments on both two public and one private dataset to verify that OptDist outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. Furthermore, OptDist has been deployed on a large-scale financial platform for customer acquisition marketing campaigns and the online experiments also demonstrate the effectiveness of OptDist.

Optimization problems are pervasive in sectors from manufacturing and distribution to healthcare. However, most such problems are still solved heuristically by hand rather than optimally by state-of-the-art solvers because the expertise required to formulate and solve these problems limits the widespread adoption of optimization tools and techniques. This paper introduces OptiMUS, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent designed to formulate and solve (mixed integer) linear programming problems from their natural language descriptions. OptiMUS can develop mathematical models, write and debug solver code, evaluate the generated solutions, and improve its model and code based on these evaluations. OptiMUS utilizes a modular structure to process problems, allowing it to handle problems with long descriptions and complex data without long prompts. Experiments demonstrate that OptiMUS outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods on easy datasets by more than 20% and on hard datasets (including a new dataset, NLP4LP, released with this paper that features long and complex problems) by more than 30%.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

In reinforcement learning (RL), rewards of states are typically considered additive, and following the Markov assumption, they are independent of states visited previously. In many important applications, such as coverage control, experiment design and informative path planning, rewards naturally have diminishing returns, i.e., their value decreases in light of similar states visited previously. To tackle this, we propose submodular RL (SubRL), a paradigm which seeks to optimize more general, non-additive (and history-dependent) rewards modelled via submodular set functions which capture diminishing returns. Unfortunately, in general, even in tabular settings, we show that the resulting optimization problem is hard to approximate. On the other hand, motivated by the success of greedy algorithms in classical submodular optimization, we propose SubPO, a simple policy gradient-based algorithm for SubRL that handles non-additive rewards by greedily maximizing marginal gains. Indeed, under some assumptions on the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP), SubPO recovers optimal constant factor approximations of submodular bandits. Moreover, we derive a natural policy gradient approach for locally optimizing SubRL instances even in large state- and action- spaces. We showcase the versatility of our approach by applying SubPO to several applications, such as biodiversity monitoring, Bayesian experiment design, informative path planning, and coverage maximization. Our results demonstrate sample efficiency, as well as scalability to high-dimensional state-action spaces.